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1. Introduction
The number of research papers focused on terrorism 
has increased dramatically since the 9/11 tragedy [1]. 
They have produced many etiological theories and 
opinions regarding pathways to terrorism [2]. Nevertheless, 
there remains a deficiency of empirical research into 
terrorism [3,4]. There has been limited valid and systematic 
examination of individual risk factors for terrorism [5]. 
The deficiency of empirical researches on terrorism risk 
assessment and effective rehabilitation is caused by many 
factors; however, it is assumed to be primarily because 
of the difficulty in engagement with terrorists [6] and 
confidentiality and the sensitivity of the issue [7], making 
research and publication very challenging. Furthermore, 
there is a potential that terrorism researchers may be 
subjected to close and critical observation and suspicion 
from both authorities and terrorism networks alike [8]. 
In terms of investigation into individual terrorism risk 
factors, there is an increasing debate among scholars (in 
Criminology and Forensic Psychology) regarding whether 
general criminal risk assessment methods are applicable 
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government offices [14-17]. Due to the lack of knowledge 
and research on risk factors of terrorists after detained, 
several security agencies simply categorise perpetrators 
into unclear categories (e.g., ‘radical vs non-radical’, 
‘cooperative vs non-cooperative’, and ‘capable vs not 
capable to make bomb’ [18-23]. Further, some Western 
instruments for terrorists in Indonesian prisons do not 
thoroughly fit into Indonesian context and culture [24].
Against this background, ‘MIKRA’ Motivation-
Ideology-Capability  (MIC) Risk Assessment was 
developed to identify individual criminogenic risk 
factors and needs (“Risk-Need”) of terrorist offenders 
in Indonesia. This study was formulated to set up future 
parameters of effective rehabilitation/responsivity 
to terrorism. The study was inspired by Psychology 
of Criminal Conduct (PCC) which emphasizes the 
identification of Risk and Need of criminal offenders, 
before Responsivity (RNR) or rehabilitation/treatment [25]. 
PCC itself is holistic and multidisciplinary and open to the 
contributions of any discipline in explaining individual 
differences in the criminal behavior of individuals [26]. 
The study was conducted in Indonesia which is aimed to 
increase knowledge to contribute to the risk assessment 
of ideology-based terrorist offenders in Indonesia, 
particularly to define their individual risk factors. 
2. Causes of Terrorism
Schmid [27] collected 109 academic definitions of 
terrorism and argued that the number of available 
definitions of terrorism might be similar to the number 
of published experts in the field. Hence, the lack of 
consensus is undeniable and expected, given the variety 
of terrorist offenders’ behaviors, the various declared 
or assumed motivations, and the question of whose 
perspective is accepted regarding the terrorist offenders’ 
behavior; in other words, one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter [28,29]. Nevertheless, two elements 
are commonly found in contemporary definitions of 
terrorism: 1. terrorism involves aggression against non-
combatants, and 2. instead of accomplishing a political 
goal, the terrorist action in itself is expected by its 
perpetrator to influence a targeted audience’s behaviors, to 
meet the goals of the terrorist [30,31].
Terrorism is complex and multifaceted, and actors 
involved can be classified across multiple variables. 
Schultz, in Victoroff [32], suggested seven variables (cause, 
environment, goal, strategy, means, organization, and 
participation), could be used to classify terrorism into two 
higher-order types, revolutionary versus sub-revolutionary 
terrorism. Post, Sprinzak, and Denny [33] divide political 
sub-state terrorism into 1. social revolutionary terrorism, 
to assessments of terrorism risk. LaFree and Dugan [9] 
highlight five conceptual similarities and six conceptual 
differences between terrorism and general crime. The 
similarities include (1) both studies of terrorism and 
common crime are intensively interdisciplinary, (2) both 
terrorism and general crime are social constructions, (3) 
for both, there are wide discrepancies between formal 
definitions and the practical applications of these formal 
definitions, (4) terrorism and general crime are committed 
by young males, and (5) sustained levels of terrorism 
and sustained levels of common crime destabilize social 
trust. The differences include (1) terrorism activities 
usually constitute multiple crimes, (2) the response to 
general crime seldom goes beyond local authorities, 
unlike terrorism, (3) the offenders of common crimes are 
typically trying to avoid detection, in contrast to terrorist 
offenders who are looking for maximum attention and 
exposure, (4) terrorism is typically used as a tool directed 
at wide-ranging political goals, unlike common crime, 
(5) terrorist offenders have higher goals, thus they see 
themselves as altruists, and (6) in terrorism, offenders 
change their criminal activities over time and are more 
likely than general criminals to revolutionize. LaFree and 
Dugan [9] argue that finding the dissimilarities between 
terrorism and general crime are no more challenging 
than dissimilarities between general crime and more 
specialized crimes (i.e., gang activity, organized crime, 
hate crime, or domestic violence). Likewise, Rosenfeld [10] 
refutes the concept that terrorism is qualitatively dissimilar 
to any form of violence criminologists’ study. In the field 
of forensic psychology, the application of contemporary 
approaches to general violence risk assessment to the 
field of terrorism is challenged by Dernevik, Beck, Grann, 
Hoge, and McGuire [11]. Further, they argue that findings 
from studies on mentally disordered offenders and general 
violence perpetrators may not be relevant to the prediction 
of recidivism in those who engage in politically motivated 
behavior [12]. Responding to this dispute, Monahan [5] 
argues that valid individual risk factors for terrorism have 
to be identified before determining whether contemporary 
violence risk assessment approaches can be applied to 
terrorism risk assessment.
In Indonesia, how to assess terrorist offenders and 
foreign terrorist fighters coming back from several 
conflicting zones is unclear, hence security agencies are 
still making efforts to create specific constructs and scales 
[13]. The current instruments of CVE (Counter Violent 
Extremism) in Indonesia are merely measuring religious 
radical extremism, not risk and need factors of offenders 
after being detained [13]. The government calls for a 
need to apply extremism screening tests at schools and 
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(Islamic school). On one hand, this finding does not 
confirm a common perception held by many (foreign) 
observers that most Indonesian terrorist offenders came 
from religious schools, such as madrasah and pesantren. 
On the other hand, this finding supports a 2010 survey 
reporting a significant level of radicalism among students 
of general secondary schools. 
3. Motivations of Terrorism
Related to typology of  terroris t  offenders  in 
Indonesia, Mufid et al. [34] reported that the roles of 
110 terror perpetrators in Indonesia can be classified 
into leaders (9.1%), middle management (10%), and 
followers (80.9%). His study also found various factors 
that motivated individuals in Indonesia to engage in 
acts of terrorism: religious-ideological, solidarity-
driven, separatist, ‘mob mentality’, and situational. An 
‘ideological-religious motive’ is defined as the drive to 
establish the perfect model of religion-based government 
or society (the establishment of dawlah Islamiyah or 
the implementation of sharia) where acts of violence or 
terrorism are considered as a justified means to achieve 
these ideals. Included in this category is participation in 
terrorism that is driven by the abhorrence of the Western 
economy-political domination, cultural hegemony, and 
military interventions in Arab or Muslim-dominated 
countries. Participation in acts of terrorism for the 
purpose of protecting fellow believers from the threat 
of conversion attempts conducted by other religious 
communities is also included in this category.
A ‘solidarity motive’ is defined as the drive to 
participate in acts of terrorism to express empathy or 
to help fellow believers, especially in a situation when 
they are threatened or become victims in a conflict. 
The ‘revenge-seeking motive’ is identified as the drive 
to join in terrorism acts as an attempt to strike back 
against enemies for losses (of lives or property) that 
may have been experienced by the terrorist actor or their 
family. A ‘separatist motive’ is defined as the drive to 
participate in terrorism as a way to meet a political goal, 
of creating a separate state. ‘Mob mentality’ is the drive to 
spontaneously participate in acts of violence or terrorism 
conducted by others, even though the perpetrators do not 
have clear reasons, their behavior is simply in response to 
the behavior of others. Finally, ‘situational motives’ refers 
to factors that forcibly drive individuals to be involved 
in acts of terrorism. For example, individuals who are 
convicted of terrorism offences through association other 
terrorism perpetrators, even though they do not directly 
participate in acts of terrorism themselves [43]. Based on 
the above categories, most terror perpetrators in [44] study 
2. right-wing terrorism, 3. nationalist-separatist terrorism, 
4. religious extremist terrorism, and 5. single-issue (e.g., 
environmental issue) terrorism and argues that each 
type tends to be linked to its own social-psychological 
dynamics. Victoroff [32] identified numerous variables 
relevant to understanding terrorism and how dimensions 
of these variables could be classified, such as individual vs 
group, state vs sub state vs individual, secular vs religious, 
and suicidal vs non-suicidal. 
In Indonesia, Mufid, Sarwono, Syafii, Baedowi, 
Karnavian, Zarkasih, and Padmo [34] studied terror 
perpetrators by interviewing 110 terrorists. He found 
that 87.8% of the terror perpetrators in Indonesia were 
Muslims, while 12.2% were Christians involved in ethnic-
religion conflicts. The majority of terror perpetrators in 
Indonesia in this study were Indonesians (92.2 percent). 
The remainder were Malaysians (7%) and Singaporeans 
(0.9%). Further, most terror perpetrators were ethnically 
Javanese (43.6%), followed by Pamonese (12.7%) and 
Malays (10.9%). Buginese and Sundanese respectively 
constituted 5.5% of participants, while 4.5% were Betawi. 
The rest, 17.3%, came from various ethnic backgrounds, 
including Acehnese, Ambonese, Arab, Balinese, Bima, 
Indian, Kaili, Makassar, Madurese, Minang, and Poso. 
Moreover, related to age (age of respondents was 
calculated from the year of their involvement in acts of 
terrorism), the average age of terror perpetrators was 29.7, 
with the youngest 16 years and the oldest 64 years. If 
classified according to the age group, the majority (59%) 
were young, below 30. Related to level of education, 
Mufid et al. [34] found that the highest level of educational 
attainment of most terror perpetrators was senior high 
school (63.3%), followed by college and university 
(16.4%) and junior high school (10.9%). In addition, 
5.5% of terrorist offenders attended, but did not graduate 
from a college or university and another 3.6% only 
graduated from primary school. These findings are similar 
to research in other countries. For instance, a study of 
102 Salafi Muslim terrorist offenders from Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, France, Algeria, Morocco, and Indonesia found 
that the average age of perpetrators (joining in terrorism 
acts) was 25.7 years, with 18 % described as ‘upper,’ 55% 
from ‘middle,’ and 27% from a ‘lower’ class [40].
Mufid et al. [34] found that in Indonesia most terror 
perpetrators had non-religious educational backgrounds. 
Around 48.2% of terror perpetrators interviewed 
graduated from secular senior high schools, 18.2% from 
non-religious colleges or universities, 10.9% from junior 
high schools, and 6.4% from vocational senior high 
schools. Only 5.5% graduated from pesantren (Islamic 
traditional boarding school) and 3.6% from a madrasah 
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on the precepts of prophethood). An underground 
movement in Indonesia, such as Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) 
and its affiliations, set this goal. JI became an umbrella 
organization for radical movements with long historical 
and ideological ties to DI/NII (Darul Islam/Negara Islam 
Indonesia) [23]. The expansion of terror attacks in Indonesia 
occurred by targeting individuals including Muslims 
whom are perceived as thaghut (evil) [23,41,42]. Pepy 
Fernando’s group, for example, committed terror actions 
through ‘book bombs’ against individuals suspected 
of having close relations with the Western thoughts. 
Packages of book bombs were sent to Ulil Absar Abdallah 
(an activist of Liberal Islam Network), Ahmad Dani (a 
musician accused of having Jewish descent), Yapto (a 
leader of a youth organization), and General Gorries Mere 
(a police officer regarded as the Western ‘puppet’ in the 
war against terrorism in Indonesia) [34]. 
According to Imam Samudra, Mukhlas, and the 
perpetrators of the 2002 Bali bombing, the terror actions 
in Indonesia were justified according to six fundamental 
teachings of Salafi-Jihadist: 1) the United States and 
its allies lead a conspiracy to destroy Islam, 2) non-
Muslims, including Protestants and Jews, are infidels 
and enemies of Islam, 3) killing of civilians is allowed 
if it is part of revenge against the United States and its 
allies for the killing o of Muslims over the world, 4) both 
Americans and non-Americans who cooperate with the 
United States government are enemies because they pay 
taxes to make war possible and through elections, they 
choose the government officials who lead the war against 
Muslims; hence there is no difference between civilians 
and combatants, 5) Muslim leaders who cooperate with 
the United States and its allies are thaghut or the enemy of 
Islam, and must be regarded as infidels, and 6) the death 
of innocent Muslims during the Mujahidin attacks are 
acceptable for the sake of Muslim interests [34].
Acts of terrorism committed by Indonesian religious 
militants in diverse places, targeted various foreigners, 
involving different actors, with different recruitment 
techniques; this is demonstrated by the first Bali bombing 
in 2002, the JW Marriott bombing in 2003, the Australian 
Embassy bombing in 2004, the second Bali bombing in 
2005, and the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton bombing in 
2009. Their goal remains the same, to establish of dawlah 
Islāmiyah (Islamic State) and implement Shariah (Islamic 
law) [43-45]. As terror actors engage in various types of 
crimes (e.g., fa’i and robbery, bombing, murders, and 
so forth) linked to military trainings/tactics and global 
networks, terrorism is accordingly seen as a ‘non-ordinary’ 
crime [46,47]. 
During criminal investigation offenders claim that what 
were driven by ideological-religious motives (45.5%), 
followed by a sense of community solidarity (20%), mob 
mentality (12.7%), revenge-seeking (10.9%), situational 
(9.1%), and separatist motives (1.8%). The finding 
confirms that religious-ideological motives, despite 
variation of their meanings, were predominant reasons 
that motivated perpetrators to participate in terrorism acts 
in Indonesia. 
There is certainly no single explanation about why 
and how Islamic radicalism has come into its existence 
in Indonesia. Largely, two main factors give the reasons 
of the emergence of Islamic radicalism, internal and 
external factors [35]. The internal factors are disputes 
among Muslim elites which have driven Islamists to 
revive the spirit of Islam. On the contrary, external factors 
include outer drives, such as colonialism or invasion [36]. 
Roy [37] describes that among the leading factors causing 
cause the birth and rise of Islamic radicalism is external 
factors beyond religion such as economic discrepancy and 
social confusion. Ideology serves as a catalyst or mass-
mobilizing factor that escalates radicalization level of 
religious understanding delivered by religious charismatic 
leaders or ideologues [38]. Dekmejian [39] also previously 
suggests that there is a continuing pattern of history in 
the form of a cause-and-effect correlation between social 
crises and the rise of religious, revolutionary, or revivalist 
movements. Mufid et al. [34] argue that in Indonesia 
economic factors such as poverty and social inequality 
are insufficient structural factors, and do not necessarily 
contribute to a rise in terrorism. Instead, a combination 
of structural factors at global, national, and sub-national 
levels are significant factors for the rise of terrorism. 
Religious radicalism in Indonesia has such an extensive 
history [34]. In contrast with the current Indonesian society, 
religious radicalism in the colonial period gained support 
from the majority of people in the country as the radicals 
was to fight against Western colonialism and to achieve 
Indonesia’s independence in 1945. After Indonesia value 
freedom of speech in the Era of Reformation followed by 
economic recession in 1997, Islamic radicalism proves 
its existence after ‘devoid leadership’. The economic 
crisis was used by some Islamist ideologues to bring 
together a wider audience. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), 
for instance, came to Indonesia’s political stage with a 
distinguished slogan: “Selamatkan Indonesia dengan 
Syari’ah” (Save Indonesia by Applying Sharia Law). Due 
to the financial crisis, radical Islamists gained support 
from their sympathizers in promoting their ideology [40]. 
Ideology-based terrorism in Indonesia is related to 
a desire to establish an Islamic state or create khilāfah 
Islāmiyah ‘alā minhajin nubuwwah (an Islamic caliphate 
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government counterterrorism agencies and units) (twenty-
seven males, five females). The names of participants 
were carefully selected based on their nation-wide 
recognized and documented products (i.e., researches, 
analysis, investigations, deradicalization programs, open-
sourced or security unit internally-used) and official 
positions in Indonesian counterterrorism. Participants’ 
roles in counterterrorism were diverse, including security 
analyst, advisor, investigator, deradicalization and 
disengagement program designer (inside and outside 
prisons), military commander, theology, counter narrative 
designer, terrorism prosecutor, special task force/field 
officer, forensic analyst, intelligence operator, cyber 
terrorism analyst, and senator member at the House 
of Representatives. The participants’ experiences in 
counterterrorism ranged from five to thirty years. 
4.2 Procedure and Material
This study involved counterterrorism experts, 
practitioners, and professionals. The study included 
procedures of data collection such as reviewing nation-
wide names in the field of Indonesian counterterrorism, 
approaching and corresponding with candidates of 
participants, gaining informed consent from participants, 
and conducting thirty-two semi-structured interviews with 
participants as data was gathered using this technique. 
After reviewing names recommended by Indonesian 
counterterrorism forums, security units, and executive 
government think tanks, fifty names of potential 
candidates were collected. The potential candidates were 
approached and provided with a description of this study. 
Thirty-two people expressed their appreciation and interest 
in taking part in the study; all committed to participate in 
the study. Appointments in Jakarta, Indonesia, to conduct 
interviews were then established. Each participant was 
given a copy of the informed consent form to be signed 
and asked about the use of recording equipment during 
the interview. From a total of thirty-two participants, 
thirty-one participants signed the consent form, whilst one 
in top-rank ministry position was unwilling to sign which 
reflects the sensitivity of terrorism research in Indonesia. 
He requested to have his photograph taken with the 
researcher to replace his signature in the form. In those 
cases where the participant refused to sign a consent form, 
the preparedness to organize a time and place for the 
interview and participation indicated consent. Given the 
participants were mostly seniors, these conditions assured 
consent was informed and voluntary. Furthermore, all 
participants refused to have the interview recorded. Thus 
the researcher performed note-taking.
The interviews used the list of questions set in interview 
they did was not an act of terrorism but based on their 
understanding of the word ‘jihad’. Jihad alone, according 
to their ideological perspective, is an instrument to pursue 
a goal to establish an Islamic state and to apply Islamic 
law [44,47-49]. An act of terrorism committed by a religious 
group can be regarded as a religious activity since it is 
based on religious doctrines/principles. Therefore, many 
perpetrators of terrorism deny that their group’s activities 
contain terrorism [50]. 
The review of ideology-based terrorism in the context 
of Indonesia shows that the terrorist offenders are driven 
or inspired by many factors including religious doctrines, 
in this case is Islam as the most common religion in 
the country. The literature review indicates that there 
are at least three psychological domain of offenders in 
Indonesia which can be assessed for identifying risks: 
1) motivation, related to internal/individual’s drivers 
which may connect with external factors such as political 
turbulence and economic discrepancy; 2) ideology, related 
to individual’s belief systems and radical doctrines; and 
3) capability which includes an individual’s hard and soft 
skills which can be used to support terrorism; therefore 
this study focuses on ‘Motivation, Ideology, Capability 
(MIC or MIK in Indonesian spelling) Risk Assessment’ or 
‘MIKRA’. These MIC psychological domains lie within 
micro level (individual level) regardless the affiliation 
they are in such as JI, ISIS, and Al Qaeda (external 
factors). 
As this study aims to identify individual terrorism 
risk factors of offenders in Indonesia, findings may be 
used by service providers responsible for the design and 
implementation of terrorism rehabilitation efforts, such as 
reducing the level of each risk factor to prevent recidivism. 
The study collected information from Indonesian eminent 
counterterrorism experts and practitioners, including 
terrorism intelligence analysts, investigators, and heads 
of security units who first-handedly examined terrorist 
offenders’ cases. The major question in this baseline study 
is “What are the psychological criminogenic risk factors 
of terrorist offenders in Indonesia?”.
4. Methods
4.1 Participants
A total of thirty-two people between the age of 35 and 
68 (mean: 46) participated in this study. These participants 
were eminent Indonesian counterterrorism experts (i.e., 
counterterrorism senior advisors, intelligence analysts, 
criminologists, and members of government think 
tanks), practitioners (i.e., in deradicalization programs 
and rehabilitations), and professionals (i.e., heads of 
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4.3 Analysis 
This study used qualitative analysis on participants’ 
answers. Qualitative thematic analysis was used to define 
criminogenic psychological risk factors. A total of 222 
risk factors were revealed prior to thematic analysis 
(TA). As the research is a baseline study which involved 
multidisciplinary experts/practitioners in counterterrorism, 
many words mentioned by participants were very 
technical; hence, the researcher asked for clarification. 
In the TA, participants’ answers were then tabulated, 
coded, and categorized into similar themes. External ‘un-
controllable’ risk factors (e.g. recruitment style in groups, 
networks, chance to commit terror act, support from 
violent groups, and anti-social associates) were excluded 
as this study only focused on internal risk factors. The TA 
combined inductive (themes were chosen taking from one 
of the participants’ answers which represented the whole 
idea of risk factors), deductive (themes were taken from 
existing concepts of terrorism from previous researches), 
latent (themes were taken from concepts and assumptions 
underpinning the risk factors raised by participants), 
and constructionist approaches (themes constructed 
certain reality created by participants’ answer). In other 
words, a name of the theme might be chosen even though 
the term was weak in quantity (but strong in quality) 
because it incorporated a broader meaning or concept, 
for example the theme ‘Mechanical and Electrical (M 
and E) Skills’ was chosen to incorporate these terrorism 
skills stated by participants: 1) “aeromechanical”, 
2)“weapon/gun-assembling”, 3) “auto-mechanical”, 4) 
“electromechanical”, 5) “mechatronic”, 6) “technical”, 
7) “aerodynamic”, 8) “drone-assembling”, and 9) “bomb-
crafting” skills, although the word “mechanical and 
electrical skill” was only mentioned once. This is due 
to its coverage and presented the eight other words 
mentioned above.
Themes were then presented to each participant for 
verification. A round-typed diagram to illustrate themes of 
risk factors, as seen in Figure 1, was drafted and presented 
to participants for verification. An interrater judgment by 
two psychologists (forensic and clinical), eight ‘grassroots’ 
deradicalization practitioners, and a psychometrician was 
conducted for validating themes (content validity) and 
diagram. 
5. Results
The results of this study show that there are 18 factors 
grouped into the following domains: Motivation, Ideology, 
and Capability. Six risk factors could be located within the 
higher order Motivation domain, six into Ideology, and six 
guideline shown in Table 1. The interviews initially asked 
for participants’ comments in open-questions and then 
probed the participants with further questions. Thirty-two 
semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted in 
four months, from late September until December 2015, 
and renewed in September 2020 through online during 
the Covid-19 pandemic. All interviews took place in 
Indonesia and were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. Each 
interview lasted between thirty to ninety minutes. During 
interviews, most participants provided simple answers 
due to the sensitivity of issue, culture (Indonesians are 
not outspoken), and concern of their safety; hence, probes 
to stimulate participants were needed. The 1st probe was 
related to the “central eight” risk/need factors in PCC 
Theory. The 2nd probe was focused on Motivation, the 3rd 
was Ideology; and the 4th was related to Capability. Before 
ending each interview, the researcher read the written 
notes and showed it to the participant as a verification. 
Table 1. Interview guidelines for study on risks and needs 
of ideology-based terrorist offenders
Questions
Given your expertise and experiences in the terrorism field, what 
do you think are the risk factors to be considered when assessing 
ideology-based terrorist offenders? Can you define each of these risk 
factors?
1st probe:
- What about anti-social attitudes?
- What about anti-social peers?
- What about anti-social personality?
- What about history of anti-social behavior?
- What about family or marital factors?
- What about the lack of achievement in education or employment?
- What about the lack of pro-social leisure activities?
- What about substance abuse?
2nd probe:
- What about chances to do violence?
- What about motives such as solidarity, revenge?
- What about vulnerability?
- What about superiority or level in terrorism group?
- What about support from terrorism group?
- What about outreach in terrorism network?
3rd probe:
- What about doctrines?
- What about targets of enemies?
- What about the understanding on contexts?
- What about militancy?
- What about attitudes?
- What about loyalty to leaders?
4th probe:
- What about reputation in terrorism group?
- What about weapon skills?
- What about military training?
- What about negatively-interpreted knowledge about religion, war, 
and strategies?
- What about social domination skills, such as recruiting, influencing, 
and manipulation skills?
- What about experiences in combat areas?
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of this risk factor includes the following concepts or 
terms: unfulfillments of basic biological needs, financial 
motives, poverty, employment problems, perceived 
economic discrepancies, and economic dissatisfactions.
Risk factor 2: Justice Motives. 
Justice Motives is defined as motives of terrorism 
associated with the needs to search for justice. The scope 
of this risk factor includes revenge and rejection of law, 
social rules, and regulations.
Risk factor 3: Situational Motives. 
Situational Motives is defined as motives of terrorism 
associated with the needs for safety and security. The 
scope of this risk factor includes the following concepts 
or terms: unfulfillment of safety needs, insecurity, stress, 
individual crisis leading to grievance, criminal history, 
personal vulnerability, emotional instability, personal 
issues (e.g., family, broken-home, education, immigration, 
troubled peers, delinquency, adjustments, substance 
abuse), troubled backgrounds, subjective discrepancy 
(personal dissatisfactions), and escaping motives 
(fugitivity).
Risk factor 4: Social Motives. 
Social Motives is defined as motives of terrorism 
associated with the needs of social support, sense of 
into Capability. The six Motivation factors are Economic, 
Justice, Situational, Social, Superiority, and Actualization 
Motives. The six Ideology risk factors include Values, 
Beliefs about Purpose, Attitudes, Militancy, Understandings 
on Philosophy, and Layers in Ideological Groups. The 
six Capability risk factors include skills in Intelligence, 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT), M and 
E, Military, Language, and Social Domination Skills. These 
18 risks and need factors and the three higher order domains 
are presented in a circular model, Figure 1 describes risk 
factors in this study. Moreover, participants suggested that 
fulfilment of the needs of offenders in 18 factors would lead 
to risk reduction which reduces the chance of offenders being 
visited by counterterrorism practitioners. The study suggests 
the contentment of needs of terrorist offenders to fill the gap 
between risk assessment and risk reduction.
Domain: Motivation.
The domain of Motivation covers all motives driving 
the act of terrorism. Motivation is symbolized as “Heart”, 
meaning interests, will, drives, feelings of discontentment, 
and emotions. 
Risk factor 1: Economic Motives. 
Economic Motives is defined as motives of terrorism 
associated with economic and biological needs. The scope 
Figure 1. 18 Risk factors in Motivation-Ideology-Capability Risk Assessment (MIKRA)
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Risk factor 9: Beliefs about Objectives (Targets of 
Missions). 
Beliefs about Objectives is defined as goals or targets 
in life driven by thoughts, concepts, dogmas, doctrines, 
and ideas favorable to violence. Their scope includes the 
following concepts or terms: purpose of life, ultimate 
goals, violence-related visions, destructive plans, violence-
related missions, instrumental goals, targeted victims/
perceived enemies, targeted media/equipment, targeted 
modus operandi/means, violence-related deadlines, and 
planned actions.
Risk factor 10: Layers in Ideological Groups. 
The definition of this risk factor is positions in 
violent ideological group(s) which describe roles, status, 
involvement, grades, layers, levels, tasks, and ranks. Its 
scope includes the following concepts or terms: roles in 
terrorism, status in terrorism networks, involvement in 
terrorism networks/criminal offense/military training/local 
or global conflicts, levels of seniority in terrorism groups, 
duties/ranks/grades in ideological groups, outreach in 
terrorism networks, and reputation in ideological groups. 
Risk factor 11: Terrorism Militancy. 
Militancy is defined as resistance to alter thoughts, 
concepts, dogmas, doctrines, and ideas which are 
favorable to violence. Its scope includes the following 
concepts or terms: devotion to higher figure(s) in terrorism 
networks, violence-related risk-taking, resistance to 
positive changes, anti-dialogue/negotiation, and rejection 
of positive opportunities.
Risk factor 12: Understandings on Philosophy and 
Contexts. 
This risk factor is defined as the lack of understandings 
of religious philosophy and its implementation in various 
contexts. In Indonesia, this factor means the lack of 
contextual insights and understandings on 1) Pancasila 
the national constitution; 2) Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 
the basic law; 3) Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia 
(NKRI), the official name of the country; and 4) Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika or “Unity in Diversity”, the official national 
motto. These are four fundamental national consensuses 
set by the founding fathers of Indonesia. The scope of 
this risk factor includes the limited understandings of 
religious concepts/teachings, various contexts (time and 
place) of religious practices, local wisdom, the philosophy 
of Islam, the spirit of national consensuses of Indonesia, 
Pancasila, UUD 1945, NKRI, and Bhinneka Tunggal 
Ika, Indonesian history, anthropology of religions in the 
world, Islamic history (tarikh Islam) and anthropology, 
and interpretations of sacred texts. It is also described by 
lacks ability in conceptual/abstract thinking regarding 
philosophies of religious values, critical thinking, 
belonging, and social identity. The scope of this risk factor 
includes the following concepts or terms: unfulfillment 
of social needs, feeling marginalized or lonely, self-
confidence issues, attribution of kindship, affiliation 
preferences, solidarity, social vulnerability, self-identity 
issues, and online networks.
Risk factor 5: Superiority Motives. 
Superiority Motives is defined as motives of terrorism 
associated with the needs for power or reaching a higher 
position in a social hierarchy. The scope of this risk factor 
includes the following concepts or terms: unfulfillment of 
controlling needs, prestige, pride, need for power, seeking for 
social status, needs to control others, and political motives.
Risk factor 6: Actualization Motives. 
Actualization Motives is defined as motives of 
terrorism associated with the needs to give impact to 
others. It includes the following concepts or terms: 
unfulfillment of actualization needs, needs to contribute, 
outreaching motives, lack of positive involvement in 
society, lack of positive organizational experience, lack 
of self-actualization, adventurous motives, curiosity, and 
needs for existence.
Domain: Ideology. 
The domain of Ideology includes religious or spiritual 
concepts, a system of ideas, commitment, experiences, 
attitudes, mindsets, and positions constructing legitimation 
to acts of terrorism. Ideology is symbolized as “Head”, 
which explains justifications, knowledge, rationalizations, 
sense of values or definitions of “right or wrong”.
Risk factor 7: Values (Doctrines). 
Values is defined as thoughts, concepts, dogmas, 
doctrines, and ideas which are favorable to violence. 
This includes the following concepts or terms: violent-
related beliefs/doctrines, low sense of spirituality, spiritual 
immaturity, takfiri, hakimiyyah, intolerance to outer circle, 
anti-coexistence, anti-establishment, religious radicalism, 
lack of personal introspection, narrow-mindedness, rigid 
thinking, black-and-white way of thinking, violence-
dominated interpretations of sacred texts, tendency to 
choose the most harsh religious practices, undermining 
bloodshed, rejection of ethics/norms/laws, non-citizenship 
behavior, and exclusiveness. 
Risk factor 8: Violent Attitudes. 
Violent Ideology-Driven Attitudes is defined as 
attitudes toward outside social group driven by thoughts, 
concepts, dogmas, doctrines and ideas which are favorable 
to violence. The scope of this risk factor includes the 
following concepts or terms: non-cooperativeness to outer 
circle, aggressions, rejection of contacts/visits and favors 
from outer circle, selective kindness (only to inner circle), 
anti-social attitudes, and hatred towards outer circle.
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leading, manipulating, controlling, and financing people, 
which can be used to manage a terrorism activity. Shown 
in its name, this risk factor’s scope includes skills in 
human-approaching, social networking, financing, 
propaganda, and micro expressions (understanding 
people). Their scope also lies in skills in directing, 
coordinating, guiding, and even brainwashing people. 
Risk factor 18: M and E (Mechanical and Electrical) 
Skills. 
This risk factor is defined as skills of using and 
creating technical, mechanical and electrical equipment, 
which can be used for managing a terrorism activity. 
Their scope is described by aeromechanical, weapon/gun-
assembling, auto-mechanical, aerodynamic, mechatronic, 
electromechanical, and bomb-crafting skills.
6. Discussion
There remains a deficiency of empirical research 
into terrorism related to structured examination of 
psychological risk factors for terrorism [5]. These risk 
factors are beneficial to formulate risk assessments to 
terrorist offenders and design interventions/responsivity 
[51]. Monahan [5] suggests that criminogenic psychological 
risk factors for terrorism must be identified prior to create 
terrorism risk assessment/instruments. In Indonesia, 
assessments to terrorist offenders and foreign terrorist 
fighters are still unclear. Current instruments for CVE 
in the country are basically focusing on religious radical 
extremism, not the risk and need factors of offenders after 
being detained [13]. 
This study examines psychological criminogenic risk 
factors and needs (“Risk-Need”) of terrorist offenders in 
Indonesia inspired by Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) 
Model by PCC Theory by Andrews, Bonta, and Hoge 
Bonta [25,51] which emphasizes the identification of Risk 
and Need of criminal offenders prior to Responsivity or 
rehabilitation. This study can help in setting up future 
parameters of effective terrorism rehabilitation in 
Indonesia. Moreover, the study can be replicated in any 
countries to understand the risk/need factors in other 
contexts. 
This study identifies 18 individual risk/need factors 
of ideology-based terrorist offenders in Indonesia that 
are grouped into three higher order domains: Motivation, 
Ideology, and Capability .  Participants described 
Motivation as the “heart” which means interests, wills, 
drives, feelings of discontentment, unfulfillment of certain 
needs, and emotions favorable to support terrorism. 
Moreover, Ideology domain or the “head” encompasses 
religious and spiritual concepts, a system of ideas, 
knowledge, the definitions of “right or wrong”, and a 
accepting critiques and feedback, and performing cost-
benefit analysis in making decisions. 
Domain: Capability. 
The aspect of Capability covers skills used in terrorism. 
Capability is symbolized as “Hand” reflecting the fact that 
these capabilities are things that can be performed by hand 
or equipment, power, or physical sources.
Risk factor 13: Intelligence Skills. 
The definition of this risk factor is skills to acquire, 
collect, manage, store, retrieve, combine, compare, distribute, 
build, and use information including complex data, which 
can be to manage a terrorism activity. Their scope includes 
skills in data gathering, processing, analysis, interpretation, 
and management. The scope also includes skills in Big 
Data management, disinformation, spying, conditioning, 
counterintelligence, surveillance, decision making, problem 
solving, and counter-deradicalization.
Risk factor 14: Language Skills. 
The definition of this risk factor is skills of listening, 
reading, speaking, and writing in multiple languages, 
which can be used to manage a terrorism activity. Their 
scope includes listening, speaking, writing, reading, 
translating, journalistic, literacy, and public speaking 
using multiple languages. 
Risk factor 15: ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) Skills. 
This risk factor is defined as skills in using and 
creating Information and Communication Technology, 
such as computers, programs, cyberspace, Information 
Technology (IT) and Dark Web, which can be used to 
manage a terrorism activity. Their scope includes skills 
in Information Technology (IT), social engineering, 
computer coding and decoding, digital forensic, cyber 
defense and security, ICT security-analysis, cryptography, 
crypto analysis, cyber-virus making, steganography and 
watermarking, web development, cyber-attack/hacking, 
Big Data development, and drone-making. 
Risk factor 16: Military Skills. 
Military Skills are skills operated in physical fighting, 
battlefield, warfare, and conflicts, which can be used 
to manage a terrorism activity. Their scope includes 
knowledge and experience in physical toughness, field 
engineering, defense, martial arts, battlefield, war tactics, 
psychological warfare, weapon shooting, Chemical 
Biological Radioactive Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) 
such as poison-making, bombs designing, survival, war 
strategies, weapon technology, guerilla, disabling security, 
trap making (e.g., booby trap), and military training.
Risk factor 17: Social Domination Skills. 
This risk factor is defined as skills of influencing others, 
such as persuading, negotiating, recruiting, mobilizing, 
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[78], therefore this study becomes considerably important. 
Furthermore, as the study uses qualitative approach, the 
results provide a rich information about targeted risk/need 
factors of terrorists which can accordingly become the 
future objectives for rehabilitation or deradicalization in 
Indonesia. Referring to Meehl’s [79] view about risk factors, 
the risk factors explored in this baseline study were 
dynamic or clinical rather than actuarial (“statistical”). 
The results provide guidance for assessors to consider risk 
and need factors in each domain of offenders and to help 
assess progress (by comparing risk/need factors before 
and after rehabilitation). If quantification is considered 
beneficial then further research needs to be conducted to 
elucidate the quantification of MIC risk assessment. 
Taking place in Indonesia as the largest Muslim 
population before and during pandemic, the study sharply 
prioritizes both online and offline risk factors. It focuses 
its attention only on relevant risk factors in the domains 
of Motivation, Ideology, and Capability. The study 
eliminates several variables when examining terrorists, 
such as marital status, gender, and social class [32,80-86]. 
The study facilitated open discussion among cross-
sectional Indonesian professionals in terrorism and gave 
these participants the opportunity to provide opinions on 
sensitive issue such as Islamic radicalism. The qualitative 
approach of this study gives each risk factor an equal 
value/quality, which means there is no risk factor that is 
more/less important than others. For practical advantages, 
this will help Indonesian practitioners coordinate and 
eradicate ‘sectoral-ego’ in counterterrorism efforts because 
everyone’s role (e.g., psychologists, lawyers, clerics, 
police, social workers, military officers) is important to 
modify the behaviors of terrorists. 
The results of this study are in line with findings 
in the previous study by Sukabdi [87] which involve 
terrorist offenders as participants. When asked about the 
differences/changes before and after deradicalization, the 
offenders in the study explained that the following issues 
were critical that needed intervention in the beginning of 
their arrestment: Lack of positive purpose of life, Lack of 
self-introspection, Limited critical thinking ability, Lack 
of independence against radical networks, Incomplete 
achievement in society, and Lack of life improvement. All 
these risk factors have been included comprehensively in 
the current study. Moreover, using humanistic psychology 
approach and viewing each offender as an active agent 
capable of generating a ‘free will’ and independent 
responses to a variety of stimulations/environments [88-93], 
the study excludes external risk factors such as recruitment 
style and terrorism networks/affiliations. Therefore, the 
study takes no account of networks-grouping issues such 
sense of values determining attitudes. The last domain, 
Capability or the “hand” contains all abilities supporting 
terrorism which can be hard and soft skills. 
The results of this study reveal 18 individual risk 
factors and needs of ideology-based terrorist offenders in 
which the first six are classified as Motivation, the second 
six as Ideology, and the rest as Capability. The first six 
risk factors are: 1) Economic, 2) Justice, 3) Situational, 4) 
Social, 5) Superiority, and 6) Actualization Motives. These 
risk factors are closely related to motives by Maslow [52] 
as basic human needs before introduced to any knowledge 
on religious teachings. 
The second six risk factors found in this study are: 
7) Doctrines, 8) Targets of Missions, 3) Attitudes, 4) 
Militancy, 5) Understandings on Philosophy and Contexts, 
and 6) Layers in Ideological Groups. This supports several 
scholars’ studies that ideology and belief systems play 
an important role in causing terrorism including in 
Indonesia [24,34,43,45-48,53-60]. The findings also support 
Rokeach’s [61] Belief System Theory which highlights the 
importance of values/ideology in the study of social attitudes 
and behavior. In Indonesia, the description of terrorism 
Ideology of terrorism focuses on violent doctrines which are 
in contrast with the sacred foundational philosophical values 
of Indonesia: Pancasila [24,62-64]. Pancasila as an abstraction 
of Indonesian ancient wisdom and philosophy (Pancasila 
means “Five Fundamental Commandments”) includes 
Five Principles: 1. Belief in one God, 2. Human Rights, 
3. Unity in diversity, 4. Consent and democracy, and 5. 
Social prosperity; therefore, it has adopted religiosity as its 
elements [65-68]. Unfortunately, Pancasila still cannot satisfy 
the mind of Indonesian Islamic violent extremists as it does 
not literally state the implementation of sharia laws; hence, 
the Indonesian government and its people are perceived as 
secular (deserve attacks) according to them [44,69].
The last six risk factors identified in this study are 
skills in: 1) Intelligence, 2) ICT, 3) M and E, 4) Military, 
5) Language, and 6) Social Domination. In this finding, 
the study shows its uniqueness by listing the terrorist 
offenders’ possible technical skills in details, such as 
auto-mechanical, coding, digital forensic, drone-making, 
hacking, financing, and CBRNE skills. The results include 
the previous findings of terrorism capabilities [70-75]. 
Due to the limited research on terrorism risk factors 
locally and internationally [5], this baseline study can 
be regarded as a reference for future development of 
terrorism risk assessments. Published information about 
terrorism risk assessment and their items are limited 
[76,77] and risk/need assessments of terrorist offenders 
within security agencies usually are not released or 
available for public review, collection, or comparison 
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to support terrorism. Ideology is religious and spiritual 
concepts, a system of ideas, knowledge, the definitions 
of “right or wrong”, and a sense of values determining 
attitudes to support terrorism. Capability consists of 
abilities which may support terror actions.
The results of this study disclose eighteen individual 
risk and need factors of offenders. The first six factors 
are in Motivation, the second six are in Ideology, and 
the last six are in Capability. The first six risk factors 
are: 1) Economic, 2) Justice, 3) Situational, 4) Social, 5) 
Superiority, and 6) Actualization Motives. The second six 
risk factors are: 7) Doctrines, 8) Targets of Missions, 3) 
Attitudes, 4) Militancy, 5) Understandings on Philosophy 
and Contexts, and 6) Layers in Ideological Groups. The 
last six risk factors are skills in: 1) Intelligence, 2) ICT, 
3) M and E, 4) Military, 5) Language, and 6) Social 
Domination. 
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